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ABSTRACT

People of the Pacific Basin must decide how to manage the Pacific Ocean commons, who does what in a changing industrial structure, and how to adapt to the new technological revolution. Although the United Nations' Law of the Sea moved into national jurisdiction many of the ocean resources of the Pacific Region, there is one new major resource--ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC)--which, if managed well and in a cooperative manner, could be a source of much needed energy. OTEC is based on the idea that the substantial differences in temperature between the ocean surface and deep waters can be converted into energy by pumping the cold water to the surface. In the 21st century, sharing an ocean may be at least as good a basis for cooperation as sharing a land mass. The established leadership of each Pacific Region country--in politics, corporations, and trade unions--is making the readjustments made necessary by technological advancement. International cooperation can also help. Governments should try, through international agreements, to gain access to rich markets abroad for their products. An international central bank should be developed to shield the international monetary system from the domestic vagaries of U.S. monetary policy. As is much of the world, the Pacific Basin is fast becoming an information society. The implications are tremendous. For example, because of communication satellites and fast computers, people of the Pacific Basin no longer need to think of themselves as living in a remote part of the world. If they so choose, they too can participate in rule, power, and authority. (RM)

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THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC BASIN

A Keynote Address

by

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You have asked me to talk about the future of the region we share, which is Pacific in nothing but name. Fortunately for you I lack the confidence in the predictive sciences of my futurist friends, those computerized Cassandras who always seem to confuse current trends with human destiny -- and make such good money out of quantifying the road to disaster. My preference is the extrapolation of metaphors, which are sometimes more accurate than numbers, and often more durable as well.

One durable metaphor is the notion of "Pacific Community." It lacks content just now. New Zealand's role in the decades ahead may be to help convert a vague concept into hard policy. Let me explain, at some length I'm afraid, what I have in mind.

The case for thinking hard about the Pacific-as-a-whole is not rooted in that misbegotten marriage of geography and strategy called "geopolitics".

In the years just after the Second World War, the statesmen who put together the structure of world order were sure that the way to disaggregate from global governance was to create a string of strong regional organizations. They assumed that land masses would form the primary units of a manageable world. Yet with the single exception of Western Europe, the land-based concepts of geopolitics did not turn out to be a workable basis for international organization.

CENTO is dead and SEATO, if not dead, is buried. The OAU and the OAS have not been able to tackle effectively the main development and peacekeeping tasks confronting Africa and the Western Hemisphere. (On peacekeeping and human-rights issues, they have often proved out a geopolitical theorem I suggested some years ago -- that courage is directly proportional to distance from the problem. That theorem, by the way, makes New Zealand the most courageous nation on earth.) OECD came to life only when it reached out beyond its European origins to embrace first Canada and the United States, then New Zealand, Australia and Japan -- in other words, when it became a "functional region" as the club of industrial democracies. And, in the 1970s, the most influential new force in international affairs turned out to be OPEC, another "functional region."

No, the emerging politics of the Pacific Basin is not geopolitics. It arises from the thickening web of interdependence, especially among the richer countries, and from sharpening issues of fairness, between richer and poorer peoples of a region rich in both natural resources and educable people.

In the late 1970s a sudden wave of organizational enthusiasm crested for thinking about the Pacific in the round. Japan's Prime Minister (1979-80) Masayoshi Ohira initially envisioned the concept of a "Pacific Community" and discovered a mutually interested party in Australia's then Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser. In fact, Australia sponsored the first in a series of seminars about a Pacific Community of nations. Meanwhile, in the United States, congressional committees compiled reports and held hearings on the Pacific Community idea.

In the structure of world order the technologically strong are usually the first to demand and establish new organizations and institutions. The technologically weak -- the developing nations -- customarily react with apprehension, figuring that the strong want to freeze their comparative strength. So it was with the Pacific Community. A Korean described the concept as "a prematurely born child." Voices from ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), protective of their newly valued subregional cooperation, were fiercely cautious about what one of their spokesmen called "promoting a generalized Community."

In the Western Pacific and East Asia, wartime Japan's Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere still lives in memory. Forty years later, a kind of coprosperity sphere already exists de facto, promoted by certifiably democratic politicians in Japan, Australia, and the United States. But it also still provokes disturbing overtones. Just now, it seems, every U.S., Japanese, or Australian drumbeat for new Pacific-wide political institutions intensifies the polite-but-firm, passive resistance of the Pacific's "South" -- ASEAN, the Pacific islands, the Republic of Korea, and the two parts of a still divided China.

Until there is some consensus about what has to be done and by whom, the questions raised by "Pacific Community" in its generalized form are unanswerable because prematurely political. A political question like "Which countries should be 'members' of a Pacific Community?" can be addressed only in the context of the more interesting, if more difficult, functional questions: What actions are required, and which countries are in a position to do what about them? What concrete problems need to be tackled, what functions need to be performed that might require new forms of international consultation, cooperation, coordination, parallel national action, or common action by communities-of-the-concerned in the Pacific Basin?

The roads just ahead, at the fork between conflict and cooperation, are strewn with policy choices. Choices in three functional fields stand out, in which the actions of governments

and nongovernments will make the Pacific region a model of peaceful change or a perilous example of man's capacity to make his own actions the enemy of his purposes.

One is the need to manage in common the Pacific ocean commons. Another is the need for an orderly readjustment of who does what in a changing industrial structure, and a changing food-and-development scene. And a third will bring us to the most dynamic changes of all -- the Pacific fallout of a new technological revolution: the explosive convergence of information technology and satellite communications.

II

Since most of the Pacific Region is water, let's start with the Ocean itself. Today it's still mostly an avenue for transportation and an arena for projecting marine military might. Tomorrow the world's greatest ocean can be rich in the production and processing as well as the transport of energy, and richer too in the extraction of mineral and food resources.

But who will reap what proportion of the yield of the seas and the ocean floor, at what cost and for whose benefit? That is, of course, what more than a decade of ocean law negotiation has been about.

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (nicknamed UNCLOS III) accomplished many changes in international law and practice, even in the temporary absence of a U.S. signature. But its achievements did not include what it set out to do, which was to govern a global commons by international agreement.

Amidst all the rhetoric of the 1970s about a fairer new international economic order, UNCLOS III was the only real negotiation about structural change. The starting point was a U.N. General Assembly resolution declaring the oceans to be "the common heritage of mankind." But when the smoke cleared, a very large part of that "common heritage" had been chopped up into 12-mile territorial seas, 24-mile contiguous zones, 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones, and definitions of the

"continental shelf" that can run out to 350 miles and plunge as deep as 2,500 meters below the surface, depending on the geological formation.

"What happened to the ocean commons?" A professor from Singapore answered her own rhetorical question at our first Pacific Basin workshop held in Tokyo in 1981. "They put the cake on the table, and the cake disappeared."

Three quarters of the 120 coastal nations have already staked out 200-mile economic zones, and are bravely acting as though they were both legal and policeable. They may well have become "legal". Most of them will never be policeable. Consider a single example: Indonesia with its 13,000 islands adds 660,000 square nautical miles to its national jurisdiction. New Zealand adds some 815,000 nautical square miles to its national responsibilities; how many gunboats would it take to patrol that enormous stretch of the South Pacific?

The Law of the Sea Treaty -- the great sea grab of the 20th Century -- moves into national jurisdiction most of the traditional marine resources. That includes 90% of the ocean's fish -- and thus 90% of the disputes over who will have access to whose fish. Even the "highly migratory species" -- such as the Pacific tuna and salmon which ignorantly pay no attention to the lines man so carefully draws in the water -- are ruled subject to national jurisdiction. The United States Congress, in a recent fit of legislative fancy, has declared

that salmon spawned in U.S. rivers carry their American citizenship with them wherever they swim. But the Coast Guard, even reinforced by the FBI's computers and the U.S. Navy's gunships, will never learn about most of the trawlers that catch these made-in-America salmon as the fish exercise their "freedom of the seas."

The great sea grab also nationalized most of the Pacific's remaining known deposits of offshore oil and gas, and very large areas of tropical ocean which may be the source of a great new energy resource in the 21st Century -- ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC), which was never seriously considered in the Law of the Sea negotiations.

A special word may be in order, about this potentially major new factor in Pacific Basin development. OTEC, proved out in a Hawaii experiment only in 1979, is based on the idea that the substantial differences in temperature between the ocean surface and deep waters can be converted into energy by pumping the cold water to the surface. The electricity such a system makes possible can be used either directly (for processing operations at sea or on nearby islands) or indirectly (for powering the local production of synthetic fuel from sea-borne coal or for producing energy in transportable form).

While there will eventually be applications of OTEC in many parts of the world, it is quintessentially a tropical and a Pacific resource. Most of the best places for OTEC, which

needs 5-6,000 feet of depth and will be optimal in tropical waters (latitudes from -20° to $+20^{\circ}$), are either clearly in the high-seas commons or in the claimed economic jurisdictions of developing countries, including, especially, islands in the South Pacific. OTEC does not have to be a large central system; the resource could be adapted to the power needs of an island nation or a large (e.g. synthetic fuel) operation.

Energy from the ocean thermal gradient is inherently a developing-world resource, but it can be exploited only by advanced technology from the "Northern" industrial world. So the road divides just ahead: conflict, or cooperation?

The thermal-conversion potentials are theoretically enormous. In the world's oceans between -20° and $+20^{\circ}$ latitude, some 1,000 quads (quadrillion British Thermal Units) per year are quietly unexploited today -- three times the current world demand for energy, perhaps one-third of world energy demand 100 years from now.

Like other forms of "solar" energy, the time-scale for OTEC development will be long. But you have to look more than 20 years ahead for significant development of all the really important alternatives to oil as the world's dominant energy source. (The one exception is conservation, which can be done right away.) And if development doesn't start now, we will still be overdependent on dwindling pools of oil even in the first part of the 21st Century.

The environmental effects of OTEC may actually be positive. In 1981 I listened in Tokyo to a Japanese expert explain how the nutrients brought up from the deep sea along with the cold water could be used to produce biomass that could be the basis for producing more energy (in the form of methane) from biomass, or food from aquaculture. The nutrients brought up as an OTEC byproduct could be an environmental "problem" (for example, by producing eutrophication in an enclosed sea), but can also be managed as the basis for new technology-based biomass industry. (That still leaves some interesting uncertainties. If nutrients are brought up from the deep-ocean "commons," who is entitled to the resulting biomass, who owns the resulting methane?)

On the high seas, some international regulation of OTEC "grazing rights" might eventually be necessary. A Korean expert has already proposed a "Commons Agency" to develop OTEC, a partnership between those who might invest in the system and the residents of the tropical regions in which it will have to be developed.

Offshore oil and gas have already been pre-empted by the Treaty-based sea grab. Only the much overrated manganese nodules (hardly worth investing in billion-dollar mining operations just now, with copper and nickel a drug on the international market) and the geothermal vents, which may eventually be the world's greatest residual source of valuable minerals, remain as primary mineral assets of "the hole in the doughnut,"

the ocean commons -- together with naval vessels and OTEC "grazing rights" and migratory fish and ships.

The idea of a Pacific marine commons will not go away. Even in their own economic zones, nations retain the obligation to take their neighbors' interests into account in their national actions (or inactions). The 1970s saw the great sea grab. The 1990s may see the pendulum swing back, as conflict proves to be an albatross to development, and the pooling of sovereignty to manage the ocean commons comes to seem as natural as it already does in the satellite-based World Weather Watch or the successful collaboration of 150 nations in controlling epidemic disease.

In the 21st Century, sharing an ocean may be at least as good a basis for cooperation as sharing a land mass. Oceans have traditionally been regarded as separating countries and peoples from each other -- though the Vikings, the Phoenicians and the members of the Hanseatic League had a different view; theirs was an ocean-based philosophy now suddenly up-to-date in these closing years of the 20th Century. For the 21st Century, it makes sense to think of oceans as a primary means of bringing functional partners together for development, for prosperity, for security and for peace. In the Pacific Basin, the world's largest ocean is beginning to play this larger rôle.

III

In a recent Public Radio broadcast from Tokyo, several Japanese industrialists were expressing (in English) their outrage at the "dumping" of South Korean steel in Japan, at prices well below what the vaunted Japanese steel industry could match. As the program ended one of the Japanese businessmen demonstrated both a sense of history and a sense of humor. "Why are we so righteously indignant?" he asked. "Isn't this what we just did to the Americans?"

All around the world the rolling readjustment of modernizing economies is moving fast. The substitution of information for capital and labor has nearly everywhere raised farm productivity, drawn people into the cities, put them to work in factories, then automated what used to be "work" while multiplying the opportunities and the rewards for information work.

Established leadership - in politics, in corporations, in trade unions -- nearly everywhere resists the readjustment. Governments legislate tariffs and quotas to block imports and subsidies to make their exports saleable. Some business executives bet too heavily on antique technologies and use their marketing budgets to sell yesterday's products. Some labor leaders are reluctant to retrain workers to leave their communities -- and their unions -- for jobs in the growth sectors. The growth sectors, of course, are not what we used to do well (that's what's wrong with the word "reindustrialization") but what we have never done before. And for the

advanced industrial societies, more and more the new business is information work.

As the gears shift, they grind noisily. The steelmakers in Pittsburgh who are underbid on the provision of pipe to the Alaskan pipeline do not comfort themselves by thinking about the growth rates in California's "Silicon Valley;" unemployed autoworkers are not heartened by new opportunities opening up for white collar workers in banks and insurance companies. The newly disadvantaged industrialists and trade unions team up to call for help from the only government they know. And because those in distress are either wealthy or numerous, the government responds with protectionist politics, the regulation of foreign investment, measures to frustrate the export of jobs, more or less hidden subsidies, worker retraining programs, and in extremis the nationalization of business risk-taking. Yet history rolls on. The pre-industrial countries move in on the industrial economies, and the industrial economies move on to become "information societies."

The Pacific Basin is an especially dramatic case of rolling readjustment surviving the resistance of established doctrines and leadership. The Pacific Ocean laps the world's first and second industrial economies, most of the world's food-exporting capacity, and most of the economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Mexico) which are classed in the 1980s as "newly industrializing countries," the NICs. The rapid economic development of Japan and later the NICs has

not been due to rich endowments of natural resources. If anything it has been the shortage of natural riches that pushed them toward investing in "human capital": delivering education to all, and thus positioning themselves to add value to imported materials the way the educated people in the colonial powers used to do. Opting for extreme interdependence through export-led strategies made for high growth rates, yet seemed to be compatible with a reasonably fair distribution of the benefits of growth and also with the maintenance of distinctive cultural identities: the Japanese remained strikingly Japanese, the Koreans strikingly Korean, the Chinese of Taiwan and Singapore strikingly Chinese.

Think with me for a moment about the implications, for New Zealand (to select a country at random), of this finding: that the countries with the smallest natural endowments have the best record of achieving economic growth with social fairness and protection of their cultural identity. Japan had so little to work with -- virtually no hard minerals, no fuel, and land which most agricultural countries would call marginal. They had so little they were forced into a strategy of betting on their own people -- and that turned out to be the investment with the greatest multiplier of all. The poor can get rich by brainwork, through education -- that's the lesson first of Japan and then of the NICs.

Even the United States became the world's major exporter

of agricultural products not mainly because of the quality of its land. Other big countries -- Brazil, India -- are better provided with more favorable endowments of soil and climate. The U.S. became a major exporter because it invested heavily in the education of its agricultural labor force, and has had the wit to push its agricultural R&D for more than a century, especially after the Morrill Act of 1862 which gave land grants to the States to establish experiment stations and extension services to bring science to the farms and to the farmers.

The effect is truly some kind of miracle. My colleague G. Edward Schuh, one of the nation's outstanding agricultural economists, sums up this way a half century of economic history: "All the increase in agricultural output from the mid-1920s to the mid-1970s (a 50 year period!) came about with no increase in the capital stock of physical resources. It was all due to increases in productivity, with most of that due to new knowledge or information. That makes clear the extent to which knowledge is an input or resource."

In every agricultural exporting country, there is a good deal of breast-beating about other countries' protectionism. But it is arguable, as Professor Schuh does argue, that "many, perhaps most, of the barriers to trade in agricultural products are self-imposed." In the Third World especially, governments are lured by a passion for import substitution into "high protection for their industrial sectors, highly overvalued currencies (an import subsidy or an export tax, depending on

the direction of trade), a wide array of explicit export taxes, and actual prohibitions against exports." The sum of these policies is a significant shift in the domestic terms of trade against agriculture, a serious discrimination against agricultural producers.

Freeing up trade is the obvious answer. But it's inhibited by the clash in the domestic politics of trade adjustment. "Trade conflicts are all too often conceived as a conflict between domestic and foreign producers. But the real conflict, and the one each country can do the most about, is the conflict between domestic producers and domestic consumers."

It is here, paradoxically, that international cooperation can help. No government can alone withstand the pressure to protect domestic production that would be blown away in a free-trade environment. But if a government can through international agreements gain access to rich markets abroad for its best and most cost-effective products, it has a powerful weapon against the demand for protection of its least cost-effective production.

If on top of trade agreements we can get a sensible post-Bretton Woods institution -- the case for a truly international central bank, to shield the international monetary system from the domestic vagaries of U.S. monetary policy, is now very strong indeed -- we could remove the largest uncertainty from agricultural commodity markets; that uncertainty, today, has

less to do with the efficiency of agricultural production than with the wide (and sometimes wild) fluctuations in currency exchange rates. Prime Minister Muldoon has been pressing for "a new Bretton Woods." I don't know what he means by this, but if he means what I have just said, he is onto something important. The mood of the responsible officials in Washington and the chancelleries of Europe is not hospitable to experimentation just now; but speaking as an irresponsible American professor I hope the still tentative suggestions for wholesale reform of the international monetary system becomes a clamor.

IV

Wherever you look, around this dynamic region called the Pacific Basin, whether you think about marine resources or the "rolling readjustment" of industry or the development of agricultural trade, one conclusion is hard to escape: Pacific history is being driven these days by what the French call the "informatisation" of modern and modernizing societies alike. (The new word rolls off the tongue more easily in French than in English.) Peter Drucker, our best-known business philosopher, now says that knowledge is "the central capital, the cost center, and the crucial resource of the economy."

A century ago, fewer than 10% of the American labor force were doing information work; now nearly 50% of us are engaged in it, and at least half of our GNP is the production, dissemination and application of knowledge.

The actual growing, extraction and making of things now soaks up less than a quarter of our human resources -- and that ratio edges down each year as more information is embedded in mining, farming and manufacturing. Of all the rest, which used to be lumped as "services," some two-thirds is information work. An OECD study now reports that a similar trend makes information work a third or more of every industrial country's labor force; the figure for France is 45%, close to the estimate for the U.S.

But this increasingly dominant resource is very different from the physical things we learned in school to think of as "resources:"

- Information isn't necessarily depletive. Much information grows with use. Whole industries (advertising, public relations, stockbroking, banking, insurance), and organized religion and government too, bear witness that getting the word around enhances the word's value.

- Information is highly transportable -- at nearly the speed of light. No rails or roads or airports are needed, just an allocated slice of the frequency spectrum, a few orbiting satellites and a local telephone system that works.

- Information is diffusive -- it tends to leak, and in leaking multiplies: the more it leaks, the more we have. Like a virus (which is itself a tiny information system), knowledge tries to affect the organisms around it -- whether by over-the-fence gossip or by satellite broadcasting. The straitjackets of government secrecy, intellectual property rights, and confidentiality of all kinds fit very loosely on this restless resource.

- And information is shareable -- it has to be shared, it can't be sold or given away. Things are exchanged: if I give you a flower or sell you my automobile, you have it and I don't. But if I sell you an idea, we both have it. And if

I give you a fact or tell you a story, it's like a good kiss: in sharing the thrill, we enhance it. (But if my kiss carries a disease -- information harmful to your mental health, perhaps -- that, too, is infectious.)

Information is substituting for capital, labor, and materials all over the Pacific Basin; the impacts and implications are legion. The latterday combination of computers and telecommunications is simply explosive: it is now commonly predicted that by 1990 half of all homes in the United States will be equipped with home computers, most of them connected with the telephone. Judging from what I've been hearing and reading, New Zealand is moving rapidly in the same direction. Computers and communications hardware, and (much more important) the software and applications and services the hardware makes possible, will be a rapidly growing part of the Pacific market.

Are these "natural" exports for New Zealand? They don't depend on soil or climate or geography; they depend on educated brains plus get-up-and-go. So perhaps they are, after all, as "natural" as lamb or wool.

The "informatisation" of society, and the special characteristics of the information resource, will require us to rethink nearly everything we thought we had already thought through. Concepts developed for thinking about things aren't automatically useful for thinking about symbols.

Economics can no longer be merely the science of the allocation of scarcities if the crucial resource of the economy is "in chronic surplus" -- that's how it's characterized by Lewis Branscomb, the Chief Scientist of IBM.

The accounting profession is going to have to rethink the concept of "depreciation" if a very large part of GNP isn't depletive, doesn't depreciate with use.

The notion of information-as-property, built deep into laws about copyright and patents and privacy and government secrecy, is already eroding fast as xerography and videotape recording cater to this leaky, sharing resource.

And in education, doesn't the new information environment place a much higher premium on integrative thought? Aren't we going to have to teach every subject in global perspective? Aren't we going to have to take a new look at a system that awards the highest credentials for wisdom to those with the narrowest command of knowledge?

One kind of rethinking is especially ripe for attention in the Pacific Basin, where vast physical distances have always been the fundamental fact of life. Communication satellites and fast computers are gradually erasing distance, eroding the idea that some places are world centers because they are near other places, and other areas are bound to be peripheral because they are remote from the center.

The passing of remoteness is one of the great unheralded "macro trends" of our extraordinary time. New Zealand always used to be far away. Most New Zealanders I have known have felt far away. But once you can sit in Wellington and play the New York stock market in real time (if you don't mind keeping rather unorthodox hours of work); once you can plug in through television to U.N. votes or a bombing in Beirut or a Wimbledon final; once you can participate in rule, power and authority according to the relevance of your opinion rather than the mileage to the decision-making venue -- then the power centers are wherever the brightest people are using the latest information in the most creative ways.

In such a world you can still be remote if you want to, but you'll have to work at it. The explosive fusion of rapid microprocessing and global telecommunications presents New Zealanders and others, such as Pacific Islanders and rural Americans too -- with a choice (and an obligation to choose) between relevance and remoteness. There will be costs and there will be benefits to either choice -- but the necessity to choose is new, and inescapable.

V

In this new environment, many new opportunities are open to New Zealand. The heritage of industrial-world assumptions -- that your "natural products" are mostly pastoral, that caution and retrenchment are the natural order of things, that military strategy can be built on concepts of distance, that your inherited cultures and ethnic mix are protected by remoteness, that world leadership cannot be exercised from Auckland or Wellington -- are all up for grabs in the post-industrial context.

The traditional world power centers feel more and more hemmed in by events they don't control; their policies are more and more reactive to the dynamism and turbulence and agitation at the periphery. We Americans, for example, don't confront the Soviets in Berlin or even the Mediterranean these days; we run into them in out-of-the-way places that once seemed remote -- Angola, the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia, Syria and the Caribbean.

So the world awaits the initiative of the natural mediators, the countries that can do the new thinking and make the new moves that have a chance to build consensus because they come from a non-threatening source.

The visibly responsible are often too visible to take the responsibility for change. So "Pacific Community" may not be

built primarily by Japanese initiative, or U.S. initiative, or Soviet initiative, or Chinese initiative or even Australian initiative. But it may be built partly by initiatives from New Zealand, from the ASEAN countries, even from the Pacific Islands -- from wherever educated peoples and their political and economic leadership decide to assume some responsibility for the future of the Pacific-as-a-whole.

Given leadership with at least minimum imagination and initiative, the Pacific Basin has to be rated the world region with the best prospects for prosperity and for peace. Futurists have started to call the post-2000 world the Pacific Century, and indeed the Pacific Basin is hard to be pessimistic about -- if one is willing to look a generation down the corridors of time.

For the rest of this century, the central problem is all too obvious: the region's great dependence on Middle East oil and Atlantic products, squeezing through the narrow choke points of Malacca and Panama. But the Basin contains resources which with modern technologies and a generation of time could erase its energy deficit. More and more the Pacific countries will move from the periphery to near the center of the world's communication and information flows. The rapid development of educated peoples and rural enterprise already points to an era of food adequacy without undue dependence on the great world granaries -- which also rim the Pacific. In a generation,

if we can keep the peace, there need to be no "poor nations" lapped by the Pacific Ocean.

The only question is, who is going to do what to bring these bright prospects out of the speculations of professors and into the new politics of Pacific cooperation?

"When will people learn," Macaulay asked, "that it is the spirit we are of, not the machinery we employ, that binds us to others?" I have come a very long way, over the Fourth of July, to learn from you today and tomorrow, as our newly nearby neighbors in Pacific politics, "What is the spirit you are of?"